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Abstract 
This paper critically examines the security and risk management technologies that 
are being used to conduct and pre-empt the behaviour of football supporters. It is 
shown how, in the Netherlands, pre-emptive risk management in the governing of 
football supporters involves a dispersed and fragmented set of state and non-state 
actors that engage in the process of identifying, registering, classifying, monitoring, 
profiling and punishing ‘risky’ supporters, with important implications for 
supporters’ civil liberties. The paper concludes by proposing two broad avenues for 
future research drawing on the work of Michel Foucault: the interaction between 
technologies of domination and technologies of the self, and the modes of resistance 
or ‘counter-conduct’ in the everday practices of football supporters. 
 
Introduction 
 
In July 2008, the then Minister of Justice of the Netherlands, Ernst Hirsch Ballin, 
announced a set of new and expanded measures, such as mobile telephone taps and 
comprehensive banning orders, to combat football (soccer) hooliganism. The new 
measures introduced by the Dutch government hardly came as a surprise. Indeed, 
they constituted the next incremental step in a process that spans more than three 
decades.1 At the root of this process is the ‘dispositif of precautionary risk’, a 
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dominant risk logic in late modern society.2 The security techniques of risk 
developed and used in the football context seek to pre-empt and minimize the 
probability of any undesirable conduct by football spectators in the future. As will be 
shown in this paper, pre-emptive risk management in the governing of spectator 
behaviour at football matches implies the identification, classification and close 
monitoring of risk and ‘risky’ populations, and involves a dispersed and fragmented 
set of public and private actors. Any potential or actual transgressive behaviour by 
football supporters is typically constructed as a social threat, the prevention and 
control of which requires the imposition of extra punishments, far-reaching 
surveillance and the expansion of legal powers.3  
A key aspect of the dispositif of precautionary risk in the governing of football 
supporters is the continued expansion of the possibilities (both legal and technical) 
for the collection, storage, analysis and dissemination of data on spectators. Under 
the banner of ‘intelligence-led’ or ‘knowledge-based’ policing, there is a growing 
emphasis on prediction, anticipation and preventive action. This trend signals a 
mode of surveillance that can be termed anticipatory surveillance or ‘systematic 
predetection’, the objective of which is ‘not to confront a concrete dangerous 
situation, but to anticipate all the possible forms of irruption of danger’, in order to 
reduce uncertainty and to control outcomes.4 This ‘new penology’ seeks techniques 
for identifying, classifying and managing groups sorted by levels of dangerousness 
and risk.5 As Castel notes, this mode of surveillance ‘dispenses with actual presence, 
contract, the reciprocal relationship of watcher and watched’. Instead, it ‘can be 
practiced without any contact with, or even any immediate representation of, the 
subjects under scrunity’.6   
 The aim of this paper, then, is to critically examine the security and risk 
management technologies that are being used to conduct and pre-empt the 
behaviour of football supporters. I use the term ‘technologies’ to focus attention on 
the actual mechanisms through which authorities have sought to shape, normalize 
and instrumentalize the conduct of football spectators in order to achieve the 
objective they consider desirable.7 Although the analysis will focus primarily on the 
Netherlands, I argue that the technologies of government in this specific context are 
part of, and reflect, a dispositif of precautionary risk that transcends this particular 
society and can be found in a number of European countries and at a European 
level.8 Evidence has been presented for this argument in recent analyses of security 
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and sport events, such as the 2006 FIFA World Cup in Germany.9 Moreover, I argue 
that the security assemblage that seeks to control football spectator behaviour 
transcends this particular security environment. The boundaries between different 
security environments are increasingly blurred. As will be seen, some of the risk 
management techniques that were initially developed and applied at football 
matches have come to be used in different environments, usually without proper 
evaluation of their actual effectiveness and proportionality.  
 Drawing on Michel Foucault’s notion of governmentality, which views 
government as the ‘conduct of conduct’,10 I will show how the governing of football 
supporters features not only direct intervention by means of specialized state and 
non-state apparatuses, but also more indirect and dispersed techniques for directing 
and controlling spectator behaviour. Government is understood here in a broad 
sense as 
 
 any more or less calculated and rational activity, undertaken by a multiplicity 
of authorities and agencies, employing a variety of techniques and forms of 
knowledge, that seeks to shape conduct by working through our desires, 
aspirations, interests and beliefs, for definite but shifting ends and with a 
diverse set of relatively unpredictable consequences, effects and outcomes.11 
 
For Foucault, the finality of government ‘resides in the things it manages and in the  
pursuit of the perfection and intensification of the processes which it directs; and the  
instruments of government, instead of being laws, now come to be a range of  
multiform tactics’.12  
 My approach aligns with that of Bale, who argues that the collective 
experience of sports spectators has increasingly become one of ‘segmented and 
panopticised confinement’ characterized by seemingly indispensable technologies 
and geographies of rationalized order and surveillance (e.g. CCTV,  surveillance, 
security personnel, assigned entrances and seating, and directed spectator traffic 
flows).13 These technologies, it can be argued, are disciplinary matrices that create 
‘docile bodies’ (controlled, regulated bodies) which are easy to control by people in 
authority.14 As such, they seek to reshape the ways in which each individual, at some 
future point, will conduct him- or herself in a space of regulated freedom.15 The 
football stadium and its surroundings can be seen to function as a laboratory in that 
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they have come to constitute a site for the production of knowledge about those 
under observation, and a place for experimentation and training. This metaphor of 
the football stadium as a laboratory is discussed in the next section, which examines 
the evolution of security and risk management technologies at football matches in 
the Netherlands.   
 
From electronic identity card to biometric identification: the football 
stadium as technological laboratory 
 
Technology plays a major role in the dispositif of precautionary risk at professional 
football matches in the Netherlands. Until the late 1980s entrance controls at Dutch 
football stadia were fairly straightforward: stewards checked paper tickets by hand 
and spectators who possessed a valid ticket were allowed to stand or sit wherever 
they pleased on the designated terrace. This began to change in the 1990s, when 
football stadia became increasingly segmented into different sectors and sections, 
automatic entrance controls and numbered seats were introduced, CCTV systems 
and central command posts were set up, and spectators were searched at the 
entrance. By now, the security gaze was firmly in place. 
 This development took a new turn with the introduction of a compulsory 
membership scheme known as the ‘club card’. A first experiment with the scheme 
was conducted as early as 1989 at five football clubs whose supporters were classified 
as being ‘high risk’. Match tickets were sold only to those supporters holding an 
electronic identity card issued by their club. On the first day of the pilot many 
supporters successfully circumvented the new scheme, which led to its 
postponement. However, due to renewed fears of escalating violence at football 
matches and further attempts to commercialize the game, a comparable identity card 
scheme was introduced at all Eredivisie (Premier League) clubs during the 1996/97 
season. The club card was marketed as a service card designed to improve the club’s 
service to its customers,16 but was viewed by many football supporters as yet another 
attempt to regulate the behaviour of a ‘violent minority’ at the expense of non-violent 
football supporters.17  
 The controversy surrounding the compulsory membership scheme entered a 
new phase with the proposed introduction of a club card with photo identification. A 
number of football clubs opposed this new measure from the outset, arguing that it 
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would decrease the clubs’ revenue from ticket sales as spectators would no longer be 
allowed to purchase match tickets without a registered electronic identity card. As a 
result of the resistance of both clubs and supporter associations, the identity card 
scheme was eventually given a non-compulsory status. Clubs were left to decide 
whether to issue club cards and, consequently, most clubs only utilized the card 
scheme to manage ticket sales at fixtures they deemed ‘high risk’. However, five 
football clubs obliged their supporters to submit their personal details and a 
photograph to the Koninklijke Nederlandse Voetbalbond (KNVB; Royal Netherlands 
Football Association), either for away matches or for both home and away matches.  
 Although the identity card is often viewed as a customer service tool, it should 
be considered, first and foremost, a security measure. The Centraal Informatiepunt 
Voetbalvandalisme (CIV; Dutch National Football Information Point) describes its 
uses as follows: ‘In the longer term the plan was that security aspects could be built 
into [the card scheme]. An important final phase of the entire policy chain is 
controlled access control, the aim of which is to enable us to keep undesirable 
individuals out of the stadium’.18 Today, supporters at all professional football clubs 
in the Netherlands are required to have a club card for ‘high risk’ fixtures. For such 
fixtures, supporters are only allowed to buy one ticket per club card, while no tickets 
are sold on match day. In addition, some football clubs have established a separate 
electronic identity card scheme for away matches, with the aim of closely monitoring 
the behaviour of their traveling contingent.  
 The recognition that the new regulatory regime was not waterproof led to the 
introduction of new techniques.19 A novel instrument in the governing of football 
supporters in the Netherlands is the use of biometric identification such as 
fingerprints and iris scans. This approach signals how pre-emptive risk management, 
obsessed with accurate information and systematic predetection, ‘now sends its 
surveillance probes under the skin’.20 In the 2005/06 season the KNVB initiated a 
pilot in which banning orders were policed using biometric identification in 
combination with electronic entrance controls. The pilot also tested the feasibility of 
the use of iris scanner and facial recognition technologies to identify banned 
individuals inside the stadium. Iris scanner and fingerprint technologies were 
considered viable methods of biometric identification. In 2007 three football clubs, 
Ajax, Feyenoord and Vitesse Arnhem, began to experiment with the use of 
fingerprint technology at the stadium entrances in order to keep out banned 
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supporters. At the time, this method was considered ‘more reliable, faster, more 
mobile and more sustainable’ than other forms of biometric identification 
technology.21  
 Also in 2007, ADO The Hague Football Club was the first Dutch football club 
to introduce iris scanner technology to keep out banned supporters. All its supporters 
are required to purchase a club card which includes a long range RFID (radio-
frequency identification) chip, which is also used in the new Dutch passport and in 
the public transport chip card (as well as, for example, in tickets to the 2006 FIFA 
World Cup in Germany). During the application process a biometric passport 
photograph is produced. On matchdays, spectators enter the stadium through a 
sluice system. The antennas at the gates of the stadium detect the club card and 
check its validity. In the tunnel a facial photograph is produced, which is compared 
to the biometric data recorded during the application process. If the authentication 
process determines that it is the same person, the gate opens automatically. In case 
the photographs do not match, the gates remain closed and the spectator is forced to 
go back.  
 The biometric identification scheme at ADO The Hague FC, which integrates 
biometrics with existing ticketing and CCTV systems, was designed by a private 
business, Happy Crowd Control (HCC). HCC describes itself as 
 
 a world-leader in safety and security for any crowd at any ground, event centre 
or high security location. Happy Crowd Control is an innovative system, 
allowing user-friendly and fast access. Particularly for those locations where 
large numbers of people have daily access, such as stadium grounds, music 
centres, airports, high security offices or locations, schools, payment locations, 
casinos, prisons and so on.22 
 
HCC prides itself on providing  ‘safety and security from entrance to exit’, arguing 
that ‘the certainty that known troublemakers, or those who misbehave, will be 
apprehended or prevented from entering the stadium at all, gives a sense of security. 
... In case of problems with misbehaviour, troublemakers can easily be recognised 
and banned’.23 The Happy Crowd Control system is believed to ‘reduce risk to a 
minimum, making it almost impossible to get away with undesirable conduct’.24
 The use of biometric identification at football matches highlights how the 
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bodies of spectators are becoming redefined in terms of information; that is, they 
become informatized.25 Van der Ploeg demonstrates how bodily characteristics, once 
they have been translated into electronically processable data, are amenable to forms 
of analysis and classification.26 First, as the above example shows, authentication 
classifies spectators as either legitimate or illegitimate, wanted or unwanted, low risk 
or high risk. On a next level, idenfication categorizes spectators according to the type 
and purpose of the database against which the biometric signal is checked. 
Spectators may be identified as someone with a banning order or a criminal record, 
or as being ‘associated’ with a high-risk supporter group. A third level of analysis and 
categorization consists of the bringing together of biometric information with other 
types of data, such as that recorded in police and club databases, on an aggregate 
level to generate profiles that subsequently will be used to assess risk and pre-empt 
behaviour. This profiling process will be further examined later on in the paper. 
First, however, I will address the issue of dataveillance: the systematic use and 
linking of personal data systems in the monitoring and investigation of football 
spectator behaviour. 
 
Dataveillance: centralizing and decentralizing tendencies  
 
In The Information Age trilogy, Manuel Castells dismisses the Orwellian Big Brother 
scenario in which the state has almost total control over the population.27 Instead, 
Castells argues that the capacity for surveillance is diffused in society: beyond the 
boundaries of the state, beyond the public/private divide, and beyond national 
borders.28 Although new information technologies might be put to the service of 
surveillance, control and repression by state institutions, they might also be used for 
citizens to enhance their control over the state and to access information.29 New 
information technologies also create opportunities for criminal and terrorist 
networks to evade or confront state institutions, for example through developing new 
modes of organization and communication. For Castells, the most important aspect 
of this development is in the gathering of information on individuals by business 
firms, and organizations of all kinds, and in the creation of a market for this 
information. He notes: ‘Rather than an oppressive “Big Brother,” it is a myriad of 
well-wishing “little sisters,” relating to each one of us on a personal basis because 
they know who we are, who have invaded all realms of life’.30 The extension of 
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surveillance beyond the boundaries of the state is most clearly captured in the notion 
of ‘surveillance society’, which indicates that 
 
surveillance activities have long since spilled over the edges of governmental 
bureaucracies to flood every conceivable social conduit. While the state still 
accounts for much monitoring of everyday life, such government activities are 
just one of many areas within which surveillance data now flows.31 
 
New opportunities for surveillance show both centralizing and decentralizing 
tendencies. On the one hand, the opportunities for governments to access and 
integrate the data that is available from a range of state and non-state actors are 
increasing. On the other hand, new opportunities for observation and analysis are 
now within the reach of a growing number of actors, including businesses and 
individual citizens.32  
 These general tendencies can also be observed in Dutch professional football. 
The government has a leading role in security policy, but at the same time other 
parties have become more prominent: KNVB, football clubs, private security 
companies, organizations that specialize in data recording and provision (such as 
Cotass in the case of the club card and Happy Crowd Control and Tebrona in relation 
to iris scanner technology)33, and supporter associations. For example, football clubs 
play an important part in the application of new technologies and in the collection 
and exchange of general and personal information on supporters. As the organizers 
of football matches, they are required to do everything in their powers to ensure 
safety and effective crowd management at the stadium, before, during and after the 
match. This includes keeping ‘unwanted’ spectators out of the stadium and 
preventing spectators from bringing prohibited items such as weapons, fireworks or 
bottles into the stadium. Depending on the severity of the offense, clubs can also 
impose banning orders on individual spectators.  
 
Databases  
 
A central component of Dutch policy in the area of football and security is the 
development and integration of data systems that contain general and personal 
information on football supporters and groups. The first national database in this 
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field dates back to the mid 1980s. During this period football hooliganism became a 
more prominent subject on the Dutch political agenda due to a number of high-
profile spectator incidents both in the Netherlands and internationally.34 The 1985 
Heysel stadium disaster in Belgium further heightened concerns about the potential 
lethality of football hooliganism and resulted in the introduction of a series of 
internationally agreed countermeasures, which were also adopted in the 
Netherlands.35 The CIV was established in 1986 with the aim to collect, analyze and 
disseminate information on spectator behaviour. A new data system was created to 
facilitate this process. Some European countries have developed a similar centralized 
data management system, for example the Striker database in the United Kingdom.  
The national database now contains a module in which police can enter 
personal information on so-called ‘high-risk’ supporters. This module includes an 
overview of what are deemed to be the top 500 high-risk supporters in the 
Netherlands as well as of the top 10 ‘hooligans’ or ‘ringleaders’ in individual police 
districts. These lists are composed on the basis of registered offenses and specific 
intelligence provided by police and security officials. The objective is for all police 
forces to be aware who these supporters are in order to enable accurate risk 
assessment and to anticipate any potential misbehaviour.36 On previous occasions, 
such as during the European Championships held in the Netherlands and Belgium in 
2000, individuals on the top 500 list received letters warning them that they would 
be closely monitored during the tournament. Although police continue to play a 
leading role in dataveillance in the area of football and security, inter-agency 
cooperation has increased significantly over time. Football clubs are now able to use 
and enter their own data into the system, such as information on spectator incidents, 
‘problematic’ individuals or groups, expected spectator flows, and safety and security 
arrangements.  
More recently, police and public prosecutors have appealed to the general 
public using the internet and television in an attempt to identify and arrest suspected 
supporters. In the aftermath of an incident at a match between Feyenoord and Ajax 
in 2005, during which 42 police officers were injured, police were able to use 
information provided by the television audience to identify some of the suspects. In 
December 2011 police used a similar approach in their search for dozens of 
supporters of FC Utrecht who were allegedly involved in the incidents after FC 
Utrecht’s home game against FC Twente, which included violent conduct and missile 
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throwing. The police displayed photographs of suspects on the internet and showed 
them on national television. The photographs were derived from CCTV footage 
recorded during and after the match. The program Opsporing Verzocht called on the 
public to provide information that could lead to the arrest of six suspected spectators 
who had not yet been arrested in relation to the incidents.    
Similar police investigations have been undertaken in the United Kingdom. 
Football clubs and associations sometimes play an active role in this process, for 
example in the aftermath of the London derby between Fulham and Chelsea in 
March 2006. After the final whistle home supporters invaded the pitch to celebrate 
the historic victory over their archrivals. Some of the supporters charged towards the 
away supporters, and a number of short fights between rival supporters broke out on 
the pitch. Fulham opened a large-scale investigation into the incidents and placed 
photographs of suspected spectators on its official website, urging fellow supporters 
to come forward and provide information.  
As noted earlier, one form of analysis and classification in anticipatory 
surveillance consists of the bringing together of different types of information on an 
aggregate level to generate profiles that subsequently will be used to assess risk and 
pre-empt behaviour. With regard to the databases discussed above, a key point here 
is that to be suspected of being a ‘potential troublemaker’, it is no longer necessary to 
exhibit manifest symptoms of dangerousness; instead, it is sufficient to display 
whatever characteristics police and other specialists have constituted as risk 
factors.37 Put differently, it is enough to have the characteristics or profile of a 
‘hooligan’ to be treated as if one had committed a football-related crime. Once one is 
registered as such, there tends to be little escape. The implications for football 
supporters’ civil liberties are profound, yet arguably more so in the United Kingdom, 
where the 2000 Football (Disorder) Act gives police officers the power to detain and 
ban those seeking to travel abroad if it is suspected that they will become involved in 
disorder. These football banning orders ‘on complaint’ have been criticized for 
infringing the fundamental rights of supporters who have not been convicted of any 
offence, and their proportionality and legitimacy has been seriously questioned.38  
However, the Dutch case also highlights some of the problematic 
consequences of anticipatory surveillance. To give one example, encountered during 
my own research, a Dutch football supporter was arrested during a preventive group 
arrest aimed at preventing a confrontation between rival supporters outside the 
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stadium after a football match. Although the charges against the individual were 
subsequently dropped, the five-year banning order that was initially imposed was 
never revoked. The individual’s personal data and alleged ‘association’ with a group 
of ‘high-risk’ supporters, which appeared to be entirely coincidental, were never 
removed from the national data system. As a consequence, he continues to be 
blacklisted as an unwanted supporter and has not been allowed to attend football 
matches in the Netherlands. Below the issue of risk profiling is further discussed in 
relation to the risk analysis matrices that are now used in the Netherlands to 
categorize and profile football matches and supporter groups. 
 
Risk assessment and classification 
 
Prior to every professional football match in the Netherlands, the municipality, 
police force and football clubs involved draw on the available information to assess 
the safety and security risks associated with the match. Based on this risk assessment 
the match is categorized in terms of the level of risk, and risk minimization strategies 
are put in place. The risk assessment takes into account, among other factors:  
 
- the presence of supporters who are known to be violent and the threat of 
confrontations between rival supporter groups; 
- the underlying culture of the supporter groups to be policed (e.g. behaviour, 
motivations and intentions);  
- any factors likely to impact on risk, such as the activities of other groups (e.g. 
opposition supporters and/or local communities), sensitivities, history, etc.;  
- any circumstances likely to impact on the behaviour of, or risk posed by, 
football supporters or groups.39  
 
In the 2005/06 season the CIV, in cooperation with the KNVB and representatives of 
clubs and regional police forces, introduced a ‘risk analysis matrix’ and attendant 
checklist to enable an improved and more systematic assessment of the security risks 
of football matches. Both police and clubs enter a part of the matrix with information 
on risk factors and planned security and safety arrangements. Clubs collect a range of 
information on supporters through data systems (season ticket holders, club card 
holders, biometric identification) and through their safety and security organization 
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(security coordinator, fan coordinator, stewards, etc.). This information is shared 
with police and local government.  
The grading of football matches into risk levels (A, B or C), as summarized in 
Table 1, is based on the information recorded in the risk analysis matrix. A football 
match is labeled a ‘risk match’ (Category B or C) if the analysis of the available 
information and experiences suggests the need for extra attention for public order 
disturbances. Comparable classifications are used in a number of European 
countries, albeit with some variation. During the 2010-2011 season, 48% of matches 
were classified as A, 47% as B, and 5% as C.40 The risk analysis matrix is used by 
police to advise the mayor of the municipality where the game is to be played on the 
appropriate security arrangements, such as the deployment of police officers, 
ticketing and travel restrictions, and restrictions on the sale of alcohol at the stadium. 
The football clubs involved use the matrix to determine the deployment of security 
personnel. Information recorded in the matrix is also used to develop more or less 
specific and detailed profiles of the supporter groups involved.  
 
Table 1: Risk classification of football matches in the Netherlands  
Risk level Description Features 
A Low risk No extra risk of damage to persons or property 
compared to non-football events of a similar scale 
B Medium risk - Elevated risk of damage to persons or property due 
to poor spectator behaviour or other circumstances 
 
C 
 
High risk 
- Potential danger to public order due to collective 
supporter behaviour and/or extra risk due to special 
circumstances  
 
One significant restriction that can be imposed on football supporters attending 
matches that are classified as medium or high risk is the so-called combiregeling, a 
compulsory travel arrangement. This policy instrument was first introduced 
nationwide in 1984, and obliges away supporters to travel collectively to away 
matches by train, coach or car under close surveillance. Match tickets are sold only to 
those away supporters who comply with the travel arrangement. The CIV describes 
this travel restriction as an important measure to control and plan the flow of away 
supporters to and from the stadium.41 However, as I have shown elsewhere, most 
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supporters perceive this measure as negatively influencing their match-day 
experience since it obstructs their freedom of movement.42 The combiregeling is now 
a standard travel restriction for Category C matches, and can also be imposed for 
category B matches if deemed appropriate by the authorities. The restriction is not 
used for Category A matches owing to their perceived low risk. The number of 
compulsory travel arrangements has remained fairly stable in recent years: from 354 
in the 2007-2008 season and 372 in the 2008-2009 season, to 357 and 354 in the 
2009-2010 and 2010-2011 seasons, respectively.43  
 The categories A/B/C are also used in the Netherlands and in countries such 
as Germany and the United Kingdom to classify or profile supporter groups and even 
individual supporters. Category C supporters are typically considered organized 
hooligans or violence-seeking supporters, while Category B supporters are classified 
as those liable to become involved in disturbances should they occur. In contrast, 
Category A supporters are considered non-violent or friendly supporters.44 At a 
European level, these categories have been replaced by a simple, dichtomous 
categorization of football supporters: risk versus non-risk supporters. A risk 
supporter is defined as ‘a person, known or not, who can be regarded as posing a 
possible risk to public order or anti-social behaviour, whether planned or 
spontaneous, at or in connection with a football event’.45 In contrast, a non-risk 
supporter is a person who does not pose a risk to public order at or in connection 
with a football event.  
 As noted earlier, being classified as a Category C or ‘risk’ supporter can have 
very real and practical consequences for individual supporters despite research 
showing the fallacies of this approach to policing football supporters.46 The EU 
Handbook definition’s reference to persons who pose a possible risk, as opposed to 
an actual, ‘known’ risk, is problematic because of the serious infringement of the 
targeted individual’s civil rights and liberties.47 Again, we see here that central to pre-
emptive risk management is the minimization of an undesirable event happening in 
the future, and that within this dispositif of precautionary risk any level of risk is 
considered unacceptable, or should at the very least be pre-empted and closely 
monitored. As part of this drive to pre-empt the undesirable event, there have been 
ongoing efforts to improve and fine-tune the existing risk analysis and classification 
instruments to ensure that all possible risk factors are accounted for and adequately 
weighed. It has been argued, for instance, that there is a need for new risk 
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assessment instruments that are more ‘objective’, flexible and locally adaptable. The 
recently devised risk assessment instrument that draws on an ‘objective ranking tool’ 
to determine risk factors and risk locations is a case in point.48 
 
Perpetrator and group profiling 
 
In recent years, a significant development in the policing of football crowds in the 
Netherlands has been the application of a perpetrator-orientated approach. The 
Hooligans in Beeld (‘Focus on Hooligans’) approach was first developed within the 
Gelderland-Midden district police corps in relation to supporters of Vitesse Arnhem, 
and has since been applied nationwide by both the police and the KNVB. This 
method uses targeted intelligence to closely monitor and control the behaviour of 
supporters who are considered (potentially) violent.49 The methodology consists of 
mapping problematic groups and supporters at individual football clubs, and to link 
the information obtained from different data systems. The collection of information 
focuses on the identity, role and behaviour of individuals within supporter groups, as 
well as on the linkages (if any) between different groups. Attention is paid not only to 
their behaviour on match days, but also to possible offenses and disorderly behaviour 
at other moments and locations. The collected information is analyzed and cross-
checked using existing police data systems, enabling police to enhance their insight 
into the behavioural patterns and social networks of suspected supporters. The 
information from the different sources is integrated and recorded in public order 
dossiers, which can be accessed by the municipality and public prosecutor. Regional 
police corps use the dossiers to develop a profile of the top 10 ‘hooligans’ and other 
‘ringleaders’ in their district. The most significant benefit of the method is believed to 
be the improved knowledge and information position of the police and relevant 
partners, enabling early, targeted intervention.50 For example, police visit ‘high-risk’ 
supporters at home or at work, communicating to them that their every move is 
being closely watched. Police can also impose football and area banning orders on 
these individuals.   
 The perpetrator-orientated approach has important consequences for the 
autonomy and privacy of those supporters who are labelled ‘ringleaders’ or ‘high-
risk’. These can be individuals with a significant record of convictions for football-
related offenses, or supporters who are deemed ‘members’ of a known hooligan 
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formation that engages in violent confrontations at football matches or in criminal 
activities outside of the football context. Some of these individuals have developed 
counter-strategies in reaction to their being targeted by police. For example, in some 
localities an unanticipated consequence of the perpetrator-orientated approach has 
been the deterioration of the relations between supporters and police, to the point 
where individual police officers have been intimidated or assaulted. On a few 
occasions supporters have vandalized the homes of police officers in retaliation for 
being targeted by these officers.51  
 
International and European dimensions  
 
Security and risk management technologies at football matches are characterized by 
a high degree of internationalization and Europeanization. Counter-hooliganism 
police cooperation networks have been on the increase ever since the 1985 European 
Convention on Spectator Violence and Misbehaviour at Sports Events.52 
International police cooperation in this area operates primarily on the meso and 
micro levels. The meso level consists of ‘the formal structures within which day-to-
day operational police work occurs’, such as the organizational structures of police 
units, practices and procedures, and bilateral and multilateral agreements that exist 
to promote cooperation in this area.53 The micro level, on the other hand, is 
concerned with the specific arrangements made for the prevention, control and 
investigation of football-related offenses.  
 National Football Information Points and other police units in different 
European countries cooperate in the collection, analysis and dissemination of 
information in relation to European Cup matches and international football 
tournaments, for example through the pan-European network of National Football 
Information Points. Via these information points, as well as through bilateral 
communication between individual football clubs and police forces, countries 
exchange information on the composition, behaviour and travel flows of supporters 
prior to, during and after international football matches. The CIV and other Dutch 
police organizations play an important role in this process, for example through 
updating the EU Handbook of international police cooperation with respect to 
football matches with an international dimension (EU Handbook), which regulates 
international information exchange in relation to football matches within the 
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European Union. The EU Handbook recognizes that the ‘timely exchange of accurate 
information is of the utmost importance in enhancing safety and security and 
preventing football-related violence and disorder’.54  
 To enhance the transnational flow of information, the CIV and other National 
Football Information Points have developed standardized electronic forms for online 
information exchange. Countries such as the Netherlands, England, Ireland and 
Denmark are directly connected to these electronic forms, allowing them to access 
the information online on a 24/7 basis. There is also a website for international 
information exchange which includes a knowledge base where countries that are 
connected to the system can upload and access relevant documents. This website 
functions as a hub for the international exchange of documentation and information 
with regard to football spectator behaviour.55 
In 2011, the Council of the European Union called on the Member States to 
also strengthen police cooperation with non-EU countries in the area of sports events 
safety and security, and to take a number of actions in this area. The proposed 
actions are, inter alia, analysis of the existing possibilities of personal data exchange 
with non-EU countries, including the use of Europol and Interpol channels in line 
with their mandate, and examination of the possibilities for making the exchange of 
information with Interpol more efficient in relation to information exchange with 
non-EU countries where National Football Information Points or similar police 
contact points responsible for the exchange of information regarding the safety and 
security of sports events do not yet exist.56  
The CIV and its equivalents in other European countries have used major 
sport events such as the 2006 FIFA World Cup in Germany to build experience and 
engender good practice in international information exchange. During the World 
Cup the CIV collaborated with its German counterpart, Zentrale Informationsstelle 
Sporteinsätze (ZIS), using an electronic system, which enabled the rapid exchange of 
information on issues such as the number, nature and movements of Dutch 
supporters travelling to and within Germany. The German partners used a secured 
internet connection to instantly access any new intelligence that became available. 
During the World Cup the transport police and customs were also connected to the 
system.57 Although these examples indicate the increased Europeanization of 
intelligence-led policing at football matches, international cooperation in this area is 
work in progress, with regular attempts being made by national and international 
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authorities to improve cooperation. Major differences continue to exist between 
different countries in terms of both the actual implementation of arrangements and 
the quality of information provided.58   
International police cooperation in the area of football and security at the 
micro and meso levels is driven and controlled by the macro level, that is, 
international law and what Ericson calls ‘counter-law’.59 We have seen the extension 
of the legal powers available to law enforcement and intelligence agencies to 
cooperate across national borders. At the same time, there have been cases in which 
laws undermine existing law and are, in a sense, ‘laws against law’.60 The 
international nature of football fandom and football hooliganism has led to 
momentary reversals of European integration, such as the closure of borders. The 
Schengen agreement, which abolished checks at common borders between most 
European countries, is a case in point. Under the current rules, a Schengen state is 
permitted to reinstate border controls on a temporary basis if deemed in the interest 
of national security or public order, for example to prevent violent supporters from 
attending international football events.61 This occurred in Portugal and Austria 
during the 2004 and 2008 European Football Championships, respectively. Both 
countries imposed pre-Schengen border controls for the tournaments as part of their 
security operation, with the aim of ‘stopping troublemakers’ at the border.62 
The temporary suspension of the Schengen agreement, as well as the other 
security techniques discussed in this paper, raise an important issue: that of the 
normalization of extraordinary security and risk management technologies. This 
process involves a shift from a classical ‘state of exception’ - where temporary 
security measures that involve the suspension or curtailment of fundamental 
liberties and rights are introduced to prevent a ‘catastrophic event’ - to ‘an 
unprecedented generalization of the paradigm of security as the normal technique of 
government’.63 The conditions of emergency create a ‘new normal’. In the dispositif 
of precautionary risk, any level of risk is considered unacceptable; risk must be 
avoided at all cost.  Thus, Dean argues, ‘the existence of the exception reframes the 
very idea of normality’.64  
In this paper I have shown how, in relation to Dutch football, an advanced 
security assemblage is now at the permanent disposal of authorities in their quest to 
pre-empt and minimize risk. Although security and risk management technologies 
play out differently in different places, there are also major patterns of convergence. 
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International football matches and especially sport mega events are a key platform 
for the diffusion of new surveillance and security technologies. For example, the 
security assemblage for the 2006 FIFA World Cup in Germany has been transferred 
to subsequent events such as the 2010 FIFA World Cup in South Africa.65 
Furthermore, as Eick rightly notes, ‘policy transfer systems emerge aiming at the 
development of an encompassing framework, or blueprint, that is to work in 
different settings far beyond sports mega events’.66 The issue of policy transfer is 
discussed below. 
 
Beyond football: the football supporter as a guinea-pig for pre-emptive 
risk management techniques 
 
It can be argued that the football supporter functions as a guinea-pig for surveillance 
techniques which in the future may come to be used to conduct conduct in other 
settings (and vice versa, as in the case of counterterrorism measures). Control 
measures from the football environment have been applied, for example, to the 
protest gatherings of transnational social movements. Alterglobalists have been 
submitted to similar modes of surveillance, classification and repressive treatment. 
Transnational activists have been on the receiving end of increasingly harsh police 
strategies adapted from those applied in preceding decades against football 
hooliganism. As Della Porta et al. note, ‘zero-tolerance doctrines, as well as 
militaristic training and equipment, are imported into the field of protest  policing 
from other forms of public order control addressing micro-criminality or football 
hooliganism’.67  
Authorities also cooperate internationally to impose travel bans on activists 
who allegedly pose a risk. Protesters classified as (potential) ‘troublemakers’ or 
‘summit hooligans’ can be blacklisted and refused entry at the border. This measure 
was previously applied to football supporters during international football 
tournaments. Banning orders ‘on complaint’ are used in the policing of protest ‘to 
restrict movement and to extend the spatial regime of no-go and no-protest zones’.68 
At the G8 summit in Gleneagles, Scotland, in 2005, Section 60 of the Criminal 
Justice and Public Order Act, originally intended to prevent football-related disorder, 
was invoked to enforce banning orders which covered the entire region surrounding 
the summit’s venue. Two years later, at the G8 summit in Heiligendamm, German 
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police banned certain activists who participated in actions in the region of the 
summit’s venue in order to incapacate their participation even before the actual 
summit protests started.69 In sum, international cooperation in the policing of 
football matches appears to serve as an example of, or precursor to, other forms of 
police cooperation within Europe.70 
 
Discussion and conclusion 
 
This paper has analyzed the security and risk management technologies that are 
being used to conduct the behaviour of football supporters in the Netherlands. These 
technologies, it was shown, seek to pre-empt and minimize the probability of any 
undesirable conduct by football spectators in the future. Risk is calculated via a 
multi-layered system that links diverse surveillance techniques ranging from CCTV 
and human intelligence to electronic dossiers and biometric identification. Pre-
emptive risk management in the governing of football supporters involves a 
dispersed and fragmented set of state and non-state actors that engage in the process 
of identifying, registering, classifying, monitoring, profiling and punishing ‘risky’ 
supporters. Although the government, and particularly police, continue to play a 
central role in the networked approach to preventing and controlling football 
hooliganism, new actors have become decidedly more prominent in this process, 
most notably football clubs, the KNVB and private businesses.  
 The techniques of risk calculation and risk management discussed in this 
paper penetrate the life world of football supporters, with important implications for 
supporters’ civil liberties and basic rights. The autonomy and civil liberties of football 
supporters have clearly diminished. Supporters are more and more controlled and 
disciplined, and have less freedom to set their own behavioural tolerance levels. If we 
take into consideration the recent trends in other social contexts in which pre-
emptive risk management and anticipatory surveillance have become the norm,71 we 
can conclude that situations in which football supporters will be confronted with 
precautionary measures against them, without their having actively contributed to 
this process and without there being any manifest signs of ‘dangerousness’, will 
probably proliferate.  
 One ought to be cautious, however, not to over-state processes of discipline. 
Individuals are far from passive victims of the system. In his later work, Michel 
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Foucault recognized that he had too strongly stressed processes of discipline.72 
Instead, he now sought to investigate the interaction between technologies of 
domination and ‘technologies of the self’.73 Foucault argues: ‘[G]overning people, in 
the broad meaning of the word, governing people is not a way to force people to do 
what the governor wants; it is always a versatile equilibrium, with complementarity 
and conflicts between techniques which assure coercion and processes through 
which the self is constructed of modified by himself’.74 In this context, Schinkel 
signals the harnessing of a new form of surveillance: selfveillance, a technology of 
self-control in which the body is both the controlling and controlled agency.75 The 
biometric identifiers (iris scan; fingerprints) used to regulate access at some football 
stadia in the Netherlands are a clear example of this. The good behaviour contracts 
for football supporters that have been used at clubs such as FC Utrecht and 
Feyenoord are another example of attempts to make supporters into ‘morally 
responsible subjects’ that bear the responsibility for self-managing their own 
conduct. In short, the interaction between technologies of the self and technologies of 
domination in the area of football and security deserve far greater research attention. 
 Another important (and closely related) avenue for future research can be 
gleaned from the work of Foucault: the modes of resistance or ‘counter-conduct’ in 
the everday practices of football supporters, especially those used to strategically 
countervail, weaken or subvert disciplinary matrices.76 Foucault argues that ‘where 
there is power there is resistance’.77 The history of government as the conduct of 
conduct is interwoven with the history of dissenting ‘counter-conducts’.78 For 
Foucault, resistance is present everywhere power is exercised; the network of power 
relations is paralleled by (and, in fact, depends for its existence on) a multiplicity of 
forms of resistance.79 To fully grasp the practical workings and the unanticipated 
consequences of the risk logics discussed in this paper, then, it is necessary to also 
take into account the ways in which football supporters respond to and anticipate the 
security and risk management technologies that are being used to conduct their 
behaviour. Herein lies an important task for researchers in the field of security and 
sport events.  
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